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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Hordaland county in Norway, performance-based contracts between the 
transport authority and the bus operators were signed in year 2000. This paper will 
investigate the development of this particular contractual type. Apart from a more 
limited performance-based contract in Oslo, Hordaland was the first county in 
Norway to adopt a principle of performance-based contracts. The key 
characteristic of the performance-based contract is that the subsidy is determined 
by the level of service provided.   
 
We will argue that there were certain historical and structural developments that 
enabled the pioneering development of the performance-based contracts. We will 
discuss the elements of this contractual type, and investigate the experiences so 
far. We have conducted a number of interviews of various stakeholders in order to 
assess these experiences. 
 
Hordaland county is located in Western Norway. Having a population of 440,000 
it is the third largest of nineteen Norwegian counties. The county capital is 
Bergen, which is also the second largest city in Norway. Around 60% of the 
population in Hordaland live in Bergen and surrounding municipalities. There are 
three large public transport companies in Hordaland, one of which serves the 
urban area and two which operate in rural areas and the main corridors into 
Bergen. 
 
 
2. BACKGROUND: PUBLIC TRANSPORT ORGANISATION IN 
NORWAY 
 
In Norway, the “Samferdselsloven” (Transport Act) states that any person or 
company undertaking scheduled transport operations must have a “løyve” 
(authorisation) which is granted by regional government (the County Council). 
These authorisations are granted either on an area or a route basis. Therefore, 
private operators have the right of initiative, but this is subject to quite detailed 
regulation as defined in the Transport Act.  
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The authorisations also serve as licences, i.e. the right to enter the occupation of 
passenger transport operator. They are granted on the basis of good repute, 
financial standing, and competence. The authorisations may or may not involve 
exclusive rights for operations within the area or on the particular route. 
Normally, the authorisations are valid for 10 years. The authorisations are in many 
cases held by companies that have enjoyed a historical monopoly in their 
respective areas.  
 
Regional authorities (the county councils) are responsible for intra-regional and 
urban transport. The local municipalities (including cities) do not have any legally 
assigned responsibility for or control on local public transport operations.  
 
According to the Transport Act, the county councils are responsible for granting 
subsidies to the operations of local routes that the council itself wishes to establish 
or uphold. The State provides annual “frame subsidies” which are intended to 
partly cover the counties’ expenses. The county councils can agree that the 
organisation that receives subsidies may be granted an exclusive right for 
operations within the area or route. The local municipalities (including cities) 
have no legal responsibility for subsidising local public transport, but are free to 
engage in specific subsidy schemes. 
 
Thus, the Transport Act does not place any obligation on authorities to provide 
services. The School law, however, states that pupils living more than four 
kilometres from school (currently two kilometres for the youngest and six 
kilometres for college pupils) are entitled to free transport. Normally, the county 
councils covers a child fare equivalent for each pupil transported, but this does not 
necessarily correspond to the marginal cost of school transport. 
 
The Transport Act states that the county councils determine contractual forms and 
guidelines for the allocation of subsidies. The most common organisational form 
in Norway is that of a market-initiative system (ISOTOPE 1998), and most 
counties use net-cost contracts. Therefore, Norwegian public transport is 
apparently subject to less public control than public transport in neighbouring 
Sweden and Denmark and many other European countries. In practice, however, 
the bargaining power of the County Councils is quite high, as they set the subsidy 
level and also have a number of possibilities to limit or even decide a number of 
tactical level (ISOTOPE 1998) issues such as fare structure, fare level, route 
networks and timetables. 
 
In 1991, after a long process, the Transport Act was revised and the new 
legislation allowed contracts based on competitive tendering. However, the Act 
did not come into action until April 1994, when the amendments were given. As 
from 1994, the revised Transport Act stated that subsidy contracts that involve 
tendering apply for at least five years. Furthermore, the county councils may 
reduce the duration of authorisations if tendering is applied. The Act also enabled 
councils to establish “administrasjonsselskaper”, PTEs/transport planning 
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agencies that administer a number of tasks related to the planning and operations 
of transport services in the region. These changes have led to several counties 
adopting a gross-cost contractual framework, thus shifting the revenue risk and a 
number of tactical-level decisions from the operators to the PTE. 
 
3. BACKGROUND FOR THE CONTRACTUAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 
HORDALAND 
 
Hordaland county council is the political and administrative body responsible for 
local public transport. There are three major operators in the area: Gaia Trafikk 
AS, HSD Buss AS and Bergen-Nordhordland Rutelag AS. Gaia Trafikk AS 
operates in Bergen and the surrounding suburban areas and was formed as a 
merger between the publicly-owned A/S Bergen Sporvei and the semi-private Pan 
Trafikk AS. The latter company was formed in 1992, again as a result of mergers. 
There has thus been a substantial degree of corporate consolidation in the Bergen 
area. The Municipality of Bergen owns 43% of Gaia Trafikk AS and thus has 
direct but partial control of this operator. HSD Buss AS and Bergen-Nordhordland 
Rutelag AS operate the major routes between Bergen and the districts in 
Hordaland, and rural services within Hordaland. These two operators are privately 
owned. 
 
There are several background characteristics that are important for the contractual 
developments in the county: 
 
a) Large companies with considerable market knowledge 
 
Traditionally there have been locally based, but (in a Norwegian context) quite 
large bus operators in Hordaland. This is an important circumstance for the new 
contract. The companies have been large enough to develop professional 
organisational structures with significant bargaining power. Several companies 
are regional transport companies with substantial ferry, express boat and local 
boat operations. The topography of Hordaland necessitates a close integration of 
ferry, boat and bus services. This structural and historical situation explains that 
the regional companies have developed considerable market competence. 
 
However, the companies in the Bergen area were considered to be more 
production-oriented than market-oriented, partly due to increasing financial 
pressure as subsidies were reduced. Arguably there has also been a “public sector 
culture” due to public ownership in the largest company, emphasising worker’s 
rights and promoting higher wages. This culture was under pressure throughout 
the 1990s. 
 
b) Net cost contracts 
 
In Hordaland, traditional net cost contracts have been used, allocating not only 
production risk, but also the revenue risk to the operators. This is the most 
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common model in Norway. It can be argued that this model was particularly 
suitable for Hordaland, with a limited number of large operators with considerable 
market knowledge and the possibility for integrating ferry and bus services. 
 
The net cost regime provides a “natural incentive” for allocative efficiency as 
operators attempt to maximise revenues and not only minimise costs. However, 
the actual performance will also depend on the level of subsidy. In theory, 
operators will only operate those services where ticket revenues exceed marginal 
costs. With a high level of subsidies, as is the case for much rural transport, 
additional incentives are required for upholding the service. 
 
c) Co-operation 
 
Previous to the merger which resulted in Gaia Trafikk AS, there was a high level 
of co-operation between the companies in Hordaland. An electronic ticketing 
system (BUS-POS) was common to most of the companies, and provided detailed 
information about travel habits as well as being an integral part of the financial 
information system. The system was financed by Hordaland County, in part with 
earmarked State funding. The companies also co-operated with regard to customer 
information, by means of the jointly owned Bergen Busstasjon AS. The two 
companies that eventually formed Gaia Trafikk (Pan Trafikk and Bergen Sporvei) 
initiated a route integration programme in 1992, and the networks became 
increasingly integrated throughout the 1990s. The bus companies thus had a 
strong degree of co-operation on operational and tactical matters. Negotiations 
were to a large extent conducted by TL Hordaland, the regional operators’ 
association. This also increased their bargaining power vis-a-vis the County. 
 
d) Subsidy reductions 
 
Subsidy reductions in Bergen1 followed a path fairly similar to that of the other 
largest Norwegian cities until 1990 (Carlquist and Fearnley 2001). From 1992 to 
1995, subsidies fell sharply, and have since stayed at a low level, albeit with some 
increases at the very end of the decade, see Figure 1.  
 
                                                 
1 At the time of writing, we have not received data for the entire county. 
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Figure 1. Operating subsidies for public transport in Bergen and the average for 
the seven largest Norwegian cities (1986=1,00), fixed NOK. 
 
Due to the potential for reducing costs by introducing tendering, The Norwegian 
State reduced its overall subsidy to county councils by 140m NOK in 1995, of 
which 18m for Hordaland. In each of the following years, the overall subsidy was 
reduced by 54m NOK per year, of which 7m per year in Hordaland. This 
considerable change escalated the subsidy reductions in the Bergen area and can 
be seen as a further trigger for reform. 
 
The total operating subsidy from Hordaland county to the urban bus companies 
was reduced by 81,5% from 1992 to 1997. The operating subsidy from Hordaland 
county to A/S Bergen Sporvei, the inner-city operator, was reduced by 100% from 
NOK 26,6 million (abt 3,25 m euro) in 1992 to nil in 1997, however, there were 
subsidies for special services for the disabled. There were also changes on the 
municipal level. Until 1993, Bergen Kommune granted a regular operating 
subsidy to Bergen Sporvei AS. This special subsidy from the municipality was 
abolished from 1994, with the exception of a small (2m NOK) trolleybus grant 
which was continued.  
 
The operating subsidies to Pan Trafikk AS were reduced by a somewhat lower 
rate (73% from 1992 to 1997), most likely due to the fact that this company had a 
larger proportion of rural obligations, especially school services. 
 
e) Contractual developments previous to year 2000 
 
Up to the early 1990s, there were annual negotiations and a fairly simple contract 
which regulated the level of subsidy and the obligations of the operators. 
Gradually, a system of “normalised cost models” was introduced, providing an 
incentive for cost reductions. This system was fully in use from 1993/1994. It was 
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based on a normalised cost system developed by a consulting company in the 
1980s, but adjusted to regional requirements. Whereas the previous system was 
based upon the operators’ own budgets and accounts, the normalised system was 
based on more independent or objective cost standards (“norms”). This was 
considered to provide strong incentives for efficient operations, as the annual 
subsidy would be independent of financial results and subsidies in previous years 
(Gaasland 1998).  
 
The normalised cost model was considered fairly rigid, in terms of the number of 
cost components to be monitored. It was also considered costly as companies 
devoted substantial resources to reporting cost levels and arguing that the 
normalised levels did not correspond to those which “should” apply for the 
individual companies.  
 
A new contract, an “efficiency agreement” was signed for the years 1996-1999, 
including a clause that tendering would not be implemented at least until 2000. 
The efficiency agreement was considered more flexible and gave the operators the 
opportunity to prepare for a situation of increased competition. Similar to the 
normalised cost agreement, however, the efficiency agreement did not include any 
incentives for increasing revenues or patronage. An independent consultant 
evaluated the efficiency agreement in 1999, and the need for a more market-
oriented contractual form was strongly emphasised.  
 
 
4. DEVELOPING A PERFORMANCE BASED CONTRACT IN 
HORDALAND 
 
In general, a contract is required when the principal (contractor, regulator) and the 
agent (contractee, firm) have to some extent conflicting objectives, and when one 
of the parties has an informational advantage over the other (Laffont and Tirole 
1993). In theory, the authority’s objective is to maximise social welfare given 
budgetary constraints, whereas the bus companies’ objectives will be to maximise 
profits. In practice however this picture is more complex. 
 
Firstly, the authority consists of a political and an administrative level, which in 
itself constitutes a principal-agent chain. In Hordaland, the principle of 
performance-based contracts was adopted before the model was developed, so 
there was no model simulation of different contractual regimes. The contractual 
form was thus politically decided and not an outcome of a detailed decision 
making process at the administrative level.  
 
Secondly, although profit maximisation is a primary objective for the bus 
companies, they also seek to provide an adequate service. This is not only a 
subgoal facilitating profit maximisation, but arguably also a primary goal that 
could be in conflict with profit maximisation. This is due to the historical and 
local embeddedness of the companies. This embeddedness may itself prove to be 
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an incentive, but it is not easily verifiable and thus difficult to include in the 
contract.  
 
Asymmetry of information is predominantly due to the companies’ being closer to 
the customer and therefore enjoying more market knowledge than the authority. In 
Hordaland as in many other Norwegian counties this situation has been intensified 
due to the long-standing tradition of net-cost contracts. Furthermore, the 
authorities can only to a certain extent monitor the performance of the bus 
companies, and is dependent on trustworthy and precise reports. 
 
These conflicting goals and the asymmetries of information provide a challenge 
for the development of performance contracts. Before the contractual reform, the 
fare structure, fare levels, routes and timetables were decided by the politicians of 
the County Council. Operators suggested routes and timetables, which were 
processed by the County Administration and approved by the County Council. 
Fare structures and levels were suggested by the Administration, and the Council 
approved. There were no specific standards for minimum area coverage and 
frequencies as this was in practice handled through the time table decisions.  
 
The contractual reform process in Bergen started in 1999 and involved increased 
freedom for operators to designate the public transport system, involving an 
increased focus on passengers and the market, and consequently a contractual 
change. The initial proposal for this reform was, however, quite different as it 
involved tendering and a larger extent of authority initiative. The County 
Transport Administration proposed in 1998 to apply tendering from 2000, and to 
establish a separate organisation (PTE) for organising the tendering and 
purchasing. The Administrations’ proposal was not approved by the County 
Council. Instead, the County Council in 1999 adopted the principle of a 
performance-based contract, which had been introduced on a trial basis in Oslo. 
Hordaland County Council however went further and adopted a full-scale 
performance contract. 
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Actor Transport authority Operators 
 Political 
council 
Transport 
department 
Publicly owned 
bus company 
Private urban 
bus company 
Private 
regional bus 
companies 
Strategic Transport pol.     
 Social pol.     
  Mobility std    
  Accessib. std    
Tactical  Fares    
  Routes    
  Timetables    
  Vehicle type    
Operational   Sales Sales Sales 
   Information Information Information 
   Person. mngt. Person. mngt. Person. mngt. 
   Vehicle mngt. Vehicle mngt. Vehicle mngt. 
Figure 2. Division of responsibilities in Hordaland, previous to the performance 
contract and the Gaia Trafikk merger 
 
Actor Transport authority Operators 
 Political 
council 
Transport 
department 
Public/private 
urban bus 
company 
Private regional bus companies 
Strategic Transport pol.    
 Social pol.    
  Mobility std   
  Accessib. std   
  Quality. std   
Tactical   Fares 
   Routes Routes 
   Timetables Timetables 
   Vehicle type Vehicle type 
Operational   Sales Sales 
   Information Information 
   Person. mngt. Person. mngt. 
   Vehicle mngt. Vehicle mngt. 
Figure 3. Division of responsibilities in Hordaland according to the performance 
contract 
 
5. PRINCIPLES FOR THE HORDALAND CONTRACT 
 
The key principles in this kind of performance-based contract are firstly, that the 
operator is given financial incentives for product development. Secondly, the 
authorities define a framework comprising overall quality requirements regarding 
price, service and accessibility. The contract will be tendered if the operator fails 
to fulfil the predetermined criteria. Finally, joint co-operation is required for the 
contract to be fulfilled. The authorities are obliged to enforce measures to improve 
the effectiveness of the public transport system. 
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a) Incentives 
The most important incentive in this kind of contract is in fact constituted by the 
market itself. The contract is a net contract, implying that the operator retains all 
ticket revenues and therefore has the “revenue risk”. There is thus a strong link 
between passenger demand and operations. This is a model that seems to work 
well in Norway, given a fairly low level of subsidies – in the Bergen area, only 
around 8 per cent. This means that 92 per cent of the total revenues are generated 
in the market.  
At the same time, public transport, having elements of being a public good, 
requires extra incentives, in addition to the market-based, to avoid a level of 
production lower than what is economically effective. Such incentives apply for 
minimum mileage, e.g. with regard to school buses and other socially necessary 
services, although this may be granted as a fixed subsidy. More importantly, it 
applies for increasing frequency and mileage, which implies gains for existing 
passengers as well as attracting new passengers (modal shift). This is especially 
valid for peak hour passengers, when the marginal costs of extra departures are 
high.  
In the contract suggested by the Institute of Transport Economics, the entire 
subsidy amount was to be performance-based. There were specified rates for 
subsidies per route kilometre, per vehicle hour for peak hours and off-peak, and 
an additional amount per passenger in peak hours. These rates should vary among 
the operators, depending on the proportion of urban versus rural mileage. There 
was a ceiling for the total amount granted from the council to the operators. The 
subsidies should be paid on a monthly basis. 
The rates were calculated in a way that, even though the operator will maximise 
profits, his adjustment should be economically optimal, given the defined aims 
and budgetary constraints (Larsen 2001).  Thus, in summary, there are two types 
of incentives: one revenue-based, and one subsidy-based. 
b) Quality framework 
The second key element is that the authorities define a framework for the 
minimum quality of service, with regard to fares and accessibility. This also 
involves a customer satisfaction survey. In the suggested contract, if customer 
satisfaction falls below 90 % of the target level, the authority, Hordaland County 
Council, can put the contract out for tender.  
The operators are granted a substantial degree of responsibility for planning and 
product development. This means that the operators themselves decide on 
timetables and frequencies, vehicle types and fares, i.e. elements belonging to the 
tactical level, not only the operational. The authorities define certain minimum 
criteria, and otherwise do not intervene on the tactical level.  
A key point is that there must be a balance between responsibility and risk. The 
actor that is responsible for revenue generation must also have the planning (or 
tactical) responsibility. The companies have great freedom to change the mileage 
and fares as long as the levels do not exceed or fall below the specified boundary 
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levels. But on the other hand, they are subjected to the risk involved by changing 
mileage or fares. 
c) Co-operation between authorities and operators 
The third element is related to the joint responsibility for fulfilling the contract. A 
public transport committee was to be established, in this case with participants 
from Hordaland county, the local authorities (municipalities), the operators, the 
police, and the Hordaland road administration. This committee is responsible for 
improving bus priority measures, information provision and bus stops/terminals. 
This is necessary as the contract is very demand-oriented: there must be structural 
improvements that make demand increases possible. There are, however, less 
clear incentives for such system development, but at least responsibility is located 
at the authority level, something which has not previously been done. It is also 
stated that if Hordaland County achieves savings through cost reductions in bus 
companies, these savings should be used to improve public transport services. The 
operator, of course, is responsible for producing the service according to the 
quality requirements.  
One of the challenges for the authorities is to ensure a sufficient level of 
information to engage in negotiations and keep track of operators’ costs and 
performance. Within this model, authorities have less information on the tactical 
and operational levels than in a tendering regime. On the other hand, it is not 
necessary for authorities to scrutinise quality aspects in detail, as is the case with 
many full-cost contracts. The revenue incentive is in itself sufficient to ensure 
quality. 
 
6. SUBSIDY CALCULATION 
 
The Hordaland model is based on three performance items. For the sake of 
simplicity, we will assume that there is only one performance item, actual vehicle 
kilometres produced (VKM) and one rate2 (RATE), i.e. Norwegian Kroner per 
vehicle kilometre. The subsidy is subject to budgetary constraints, and cannot 
exceed a predetermined level. A fixed deduction (FD) is defined in the base year 
(2000) and is subtracted to yield the subsidy (S). 
 
This gives the following equation: 
 
(1) St = (RATE * VKMt) – FD  
 
so the estimated subsidy for year 2000 will be 
 
                                                 
2 The rate is index regulated each year 
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S2000 = (RATE * VKM2000) – FD 
 
As year 2000 is the starting point of the contract, the fixed deduction for the 
subsequent years (FD’) depends on the actual mileage level in 2000: 
 
(2) FD’ = (RATE * VKM2000) – S2000 
 
Therefore, the subsidy for 2001 is a function of vehicle kilometres produced: 
 
S2001 = (RATE * VKM2001) – FD’ 
 
The incentive scheme is explained in detail by Larsen (2001). The key point here 
is that not only ticket revenues, but also the subsidy level, depends on 
performance, i.e. vehicle kilometres in this simplified example. 
We therefore have a situation where profits (π) are co-determined by different 
performance-based factors, namely ticket revenues (I), subsidies (S) and costs (C). 
Ticket revenue is the product of fares (P) and demand (X), and demand is a 
function of vehicle kilometres (mileage production) and fares. 
 
(3) π = I + S – C 
where  C =f(VKM, …) 
and I = P*X and X = g(VKM, P, …) 
 
Given a “right” incentive (RATE), the operator will decide on a fare level (P) and 
production (VKM) at a level which maximises profits and maximises social 
welfare, given the budgetary constraints of the county council.  
The actual incentive rates that were suggested in the initial report by the Institute 
of Transport Economics (Carlquist et al 1999) are presented in table 1 (other rates 
were applied in the contract): 
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Table 1: Suggested subsidy rates in NOK for the four companies (Vest Trafikk AS 
was since acquired by HSD Buss)  
 Per vehicle 
kilometre  
Per vehicle hour 
(base 
production) 
Per vehicle hour 
(extra peak 
production)  
Per peak hour 
passenger 
GAIA 3,50 130 300 0 
VEST 2,50 130 250 0 
BNR 1,50 130 250 10 
HSD 1,50 130 250 9 
 
 
7. EXPERIENCE 
 
It is too early to fully evaluate the performance contract in Hordaland. The level 
of subsidy granted by the county council (the ceiling) is still very low, so the 
distribution of subsidies among the three operators cannot vary very much, 
compared to the 1999 level, before the new contract was signed. Nevertheless the 
new contract has brought about a number of issues for discussion. 
 
a) Increased market orientation 
 
From focusing very strongly on cost reductions, the operator is clearly becoming 
more market oriented. The operator has conducted a large-scale customer survey, 
sent to the entire population in Bergen. This is in addition to the satisfaction 
surveys required by the contract, and the results of the survey were considered 
uplifting, especially as the media coverage in year 2000 had a very negative focus. 
Secondly, a new customer service centre has been established in downtown 
Bergen. Thirdly, from August, a customer charter will be established, quite 
similar to that in Oslo.  
 
b) Use of incentives diverges from the original suggestion 
 
Year 2000 was a transitional phase, with only some elements of the performance 
contract being implemented. Many improvements are possible. The rates per 
vehicle kilometre and vehicle hour are based on the total mileage of each bus 
company. Ideally the subsidy should vary between different areas, based on 
factors such as patronage potential, route length and average speed. In practice 
this is difficult to obtain, but in the long run one should seek to calculate rates for 
geographical areas rather than companies. Another and more obvious 
improvement would be to increase the subsidy ceiling, which also has the effect of 
reducing the relative impact of the original 1999 subsidy allocation.  
 
A patronage-based incentive component, which was initially suggested by the 
Institute of Transport Economics, was taken out of the final contract. The model 
simulations suggested that one of the companies (the urban operator) should 
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receive a rate per rush hour passenger.  The rate was zero for this particular 
component for the other two companies, which operate in more rural areas with 
less demand potential on average. This proved to be controversial as the other two 
companies found it reasonable that they too should receive a patronage-based 
incentive. Because of this, and general budgetary limitations, this item was 
omitted from the contract. A model which can differentiate between different 
areas (including those with a demand potential) would alleviate this problem. 
 
The performance-based incentive system of the existing contract has been 
employed successfully, although there have been instances where the performance 
contract has been assumed not to function adequately. In the Kokstad/Sandsli 
business development area by Bergen Airport, there has been a need for improved 
services, however, the marginal costs of bus operations due to traffic congestion 
has been high. The incentive offered by the contract has not been large enough to 
cover this extra cost, and a specific subsidy (around 20% of the total subsidy for 
the operator in question) for this service has been negotiated. 
 
The contract also states that a bonus/malus system should be initiated in 2001. 
The bonus/malus is based on customer satisfaction (30%), reliability (10%), 
punctuality (10%) and passenger trips (50%). Theoretically, this is not in 
accordance with the original aim of the performance-based contract as all 
incentives should be incorporated in the rates.  
 
c) Few changes to route network 
 
The operators cannot reduce the amount of network kilometres without prior 
consent from Hordaland County. However, they are free to reduce services, and 
given the pressure on profit margins and the assumption that the initial route 
network and timetables contained a number of sub-optimal services, a number of 
service changes could be expected. This has not happened, in fact, the service in 
summer 2001 is very much similar to that in January 2000.  
 
This lack of change could be due to general organisational inertia. Another 
explanation is that there is a considerable degree of resistance among customers. 
The perceived cost of reducing service levels, including disapproving opinions, 
negative press coverage, and the potential loss of passengers on other services, 
exceeds the expected gains. One of the operators attempted to reduce weekend 
services in a semi-rural area outside Bergen. This service produced an operational 
loss. The service was retained as there were massive protests at the local level. 
This kind of reaction too must be seen as a consequence of the level of freedom 
implied by the contract. An authority-initiated decision to change the service may 
have been less vulnerable to public opinion, leading to the withdrawal of the 
weekend routes, which may or may not have added to social welfare. 
 
d) Low level of conflict 
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Both parties agree that there has been a fairly low level of conflict after the 
contract was signed. One reason for this may be that the contract to a large extent 
is based on verifiable variables, which may if necessarily be checked by a neutral 
third party. The most important reason is probably that the companies now have 
the responsibility for adjusting the network, route production and fares, and thus 
the negotiations focus mainly on broader issues such as the subsidy level. 
Furthermore, both operators and authorities explicitly share the aim of increasing 
subsidies in the future.  
 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In summary, the Hordaland model has so far proved to be quite successful. This 
type of contract is suitable for areas where it is possible to increase demand. It is 
also possible to apply similar contractual types in situations where product 
development which would not otherwise take place will produce social welfare 
benefits. The Hordaland model implies that the operators hold much of the 
responsibility for tactical level decisions (fares, network structure and 
production), and therefore it is suitable primarily in a net-cost regime, although 
other forms of performance-based incentive contracts could apply to gross-cost 
systems. This kind of contract does however require the commitment of both 
parties to actively increase demand for public transport.  
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